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THE DILUTION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE
EQUALITY OF IDEAS
William P. Marshall*
THE INFLUENCE OF Professor Thomas Emerson's work on
first amendment doctrine cannot be overestimated. His ac-
tion/expression distinction remains one of the leading efforts to sys-
temize first amendment theory, and his insights into the various
areas of first amendment doctrine continue to influence first amend-
ment scholarship and jurisprudence. It is no exaggeration for Pro-
fessor Shiffrin to proclaim that Emerson's Toward a General Theory
of the First Amendment' is the best book on the first amendment
written in this century.'
What I wish to discuss, however, is a theme that runs through
Emerson's work and first amendment theory generally. That theme
is one which posits that in order to adequately protect first amend-
ment interests, certain categories of speech must be excluded from
constitutional coverage or, if not wholly excluded, must at least be
allocated a lesser degree of protection than that afforded "core" first
amendment activity.
The major class of speech which Professor Emerson considers
unprotected by the first amendment is commercial speech; and I
will discuss the arguments he presents on behalf of this exclusion as
a point of departure for my overall thesis. I will not (to our mutual
delight) present yet another argument that commercial speech
either should be, or should not be, protected by the first amend-
ment. Instead, this Article questions why scholars such as Emer-
son, who otherwise adhere to the premise that there is an equality in
the realm of ideas and who seek broad and expansive protection
under the first amendment, feel compelled to exclude certain types
of speech from first amendment coverage. As part of this process, I
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; B.A., University of Penn-
sylvania (1972); J.D., University of Chicago (1977).
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will also examine the inconsistencies created by Emerson's exclu-
sion of commercial speech with his inclusion of offensive and ob-
scene speech within first amendment protection.
The purpose of this comparison, however, is not simply to illus-
trate a doctrinal anomaly. Rather, I will attempt to show that the
inconsistency is the necessary result of trying to reconcile two fun-
damentally irreconcilable pressures: the desire to have a strong first
amendment doctrine which subjects "core" speech to regulation
only in extraordinary circumstances, and the desire to avoid inquir-
ies into content, class of speech, or similar factors which place the
courts and the government in the business of evaluating the social
importance of various types of expression.
The question of which types of speech should be included or
excluded from first amendment coverage is an essential inquiry in
any effort to systemize first amendment theory.3 It may be true that
almost everything we do is expressive in one way or another.4 It is
equally true, however, that not everything we do, including all our
forms of verbal communication, is entitled to first amendment pro-
tection.' The Supreme Court has long agreed with the latter posi-
tion. Thus, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court
uttered its famous dictum that "[t]here are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech . . .which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words."6 While the Court has since retreated from this
position,7 the proposition that there are types of speech which are
not "speech" has never been wholly eradicated. Emerson thus falls
within tradition when he argues that commercial speech shall not
3. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: .4 Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 265 (1981). As Schauer points out, one's analysis may lead to different results depend-
ing on whether the analytic approach is one of "defining in" or one of "defining out" matters
which pertain to first amendment coverage. Id. at 279-80.
4. See, eg., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see also T. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 495 (1970) (concedes that essentially all activity
could be considered expression, yet the core first amendment issue is "whether the action
element in the conduct predominates; and whether the person is trying to tell something or do
something.").
5. See T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 495. But see Redish, The Value of Free Speech,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 629 (1982).
6. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
7. The retreat has been particularly apparent in the area of libel law, see, e.g., New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (substantial constitutional protection for
libelous statements not made with "actual malice"). See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973) (holding "fighting words" conviction unconstitutional); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (holding offensive language conviction unconstitutional).
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be considered "speech" under the first amendment.8
Professor Emerson offers three reasons why commercial speech
should be excluded from first amendment coverage. The first is that
it "has historically been treated on an entirely different basis from
all of the other forms of communication that make up the system of
freedom of expression." 9 Second, he argues that "[c]ommercial
speech does not promote the underlying values of the system in the
same manner as does other expression." 10 Third, he argues that
inclusion of commercial speech within the coverage of the first
amendment poses "certain dangers to the system of freedom of ex-
pression."1 Citing Justice Powell, he worries that inclusion of
commercial speech may tend "to dilute and devitalize first amend-
ment doctrine."12
The first two of these arguments are not well taken and certainly
do not distinguish commercial speech from obscene or offensive
speech. The historical argument is particularly weak. For one, it
was not until 1919 that some members of the Court began to recog-
nize that speech was to have any significant protection at all,13 so
any historical tradition is extremely short-lived. Moreover, as Pro-
fessor Christie argues, the problem with supporting an argument for
protection or non-protection of certain types of speech on historical
grounds is that certain core areas of speech were unprotected until
recently.4 Finally, from a historical perspective, the non-speech
status of commercial speech is equivalent to that of offensive or ob-
scene speech.15 Thus, to include commercial speech in the scope of
8. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422,
458-61 (1980); see also T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 414-17; see also infra text accompanying
notes 9-12 (for Professor Emerson's reasoning excluding commercial speech from first
amendment protection). Emerson is not at odds with Chaplinsky in arguing that commercial
speech is "not speech." Although commercial speech was not mentioned in the Chaplinsky
dictum, its exclusion from first amendment coverage was quickly announced in Valentine v.
Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
9. Emerson, supra note 8, at 460.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 459-60 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
13. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (ar-
gued that under most conditions, the first amendment protected individual speech from regu-
lation by the state).
14. See Christie, Why the First Amendment Should not be Interpreted from the Patholog-
ical Perspective: A Response to Professor Blasi, 1986 DUKE L.J. 683, 687-88.
15. Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (offensive and obscene
speech not within the scope of first amendment protection) with Valentine v. Christensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942) (regulation of commercial speech not prohibited by the first amendment).
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the first amendment is no more a reversal of tradition than to in-
clude obscene or offensive speech.
Emerson's second argument, that commercial speech does not
promote the underlying values of freedom of speech, is more inter-
esting. 16 To support this claim Emerson cites Professor Baker, who
argues that commercial speech, unlike other types of speech, is not
a manifestation of individual freedom of choice but is rather a func-
tion of market pressure, and therefore, "lacks the crucial connec-
tions with individual liberty and self-realization which exist for
speech generally."' 7 Whether this argument is empirically true, of
course, is a matter of some debate. Speech asserted for the purposes
of pursuing economic power may be as much a manifestation of self
and individual liberty as is speech that is purely political or social. 8
As Professor Redish explains, Baker's exclusion of commercial
speech "fails to deal adequately with the inseparability of the profit
motive from the desire for self-expression."' 9 Indeed, from the
other side, Baker's theory, as Professor Schlag has argued, does not
acknowledge that social and political speech may be as much a
product of market forces as is commercial speech. 0
Moreover, even if we accept that commercial speech has no first
amendment value for the speaker, eliminating it from coverage ig-
nores other critical policies underlying the protection of speech that
Emerson himself has carefully documented. Specifically, Emerson
has argued that in addition to protecting individual concerns, the
first amendment promotes the discovery of truth and participation
in decision-making by all members of society.2' Indeed, outside the
area of commercial speech, Emerson has seriously criticized Baker's
first amendment theory for ignoring these societal values and for
solely defining the value of expression in terms of individual lib-
erty. 2 Emerson's exclusion of commercial speech is then particu-
larly groundless since there is little question that commercial speech
16. Emerson, supra note 8, at 460. As an initial matter, it should be pointed out that
this argument is essentially one of "defining in" and, as such, may be inconsistent with the
tradition that Emerson is normally associated with which presumes that all speech has value.
See Schauer, supra note 3, at 280-81.
17. Emerson, supra note 8, at 460 (citing Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1, 3 (1976)).
18. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.L.A. L.
RE-v. 671, 713 (1983).
19. Redish, supra note 5, at 621.
20. Schlag, supra note 18, at 713.
21. Emerson, supra note 8, at 423. Emerson also argues that a fourth value of the first
amendment is the "maintenance of the proper balance between stability and change." Id.
22. Id. at 476.
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promotes these societal values. Professor Redish is correct when he
argues that commercial speech may "lead individuals to think about
not merely what purchasing decisions are best for them [search for
truth], but also [about] what level of political regulation of the eco-
nomic system would be appropriate [decision-making]. 23
Finally, Emerson's approach is inconsistent with his treatment
of obscene speech where he has again argued that the motivations of
the speaker is not controlling as to the first amendment issue. With
respect to obscene speech, Emerson has mentioned that to withhold
first amendment protection because of commercial exploitation by
the disseminator "ignores the constitutional rights of the reader. It
makes the rights of the individual to see or hear expression depen-
dent, not upon the material, but upon the motives or methods of the
publisher or distributor."2 4 This argument, of course, could be and
has been made with respect to commercial speech.25 Thus, even if
we accept Baker's premise that there is no individual self-expression
value in protecting the commercial speaker's speech, that does not
mean, according to Emerson's own theory, that such speech has no
first amendment value. Ultimately, Emerson's rejection of commer-
cial speech from first amendment coverage must rest on other
grounds.
Emerson's third and final argument is that the first amendment
may become diluted by the inclusion of commercial speech. This
argument, unlike the previous one which examines whether the
speech in question is worthy of first amendment coverage, examines
the harm that the inclusion of such speech might cause other types
of speech protected by the first amendment.
There are two aspects of this dilution argument. The first,
which I will call "trivialization," argues that treatment of "lesser
value" speech on par with full value speech demeans the status of
the latter, ultimately detracting from the first amendment's impor-
tance in promoting a free and robust exchange of ideas.26 The sec-
ond, termed here "devitalization," contends that the first
amendment is doctrinally weakened by including material within its
23. Redish, supra note 5, at 632.
24. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 490.
25. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source, and
to its recipients").
26. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) ("commercial exploitation of
obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment").
[Vol. 38:566
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scope whose regulation is likely to be upheld by the courts.27 Both
the trivialization and devitalization arguments appear, at least im-
plicitly, to be behind Emerson's rejection of commercial speech as
being within the scope of the first amendment.
The trivialization point brings to fore a central precept in first
amendment theory and places Emerson in a position where he is not
usually found. Usually, advocates like Emerson steadfastly argue
that evaluating types of speech in terms of social value is an im-
proper function for the government and the courts.28 There is an
equality in the realm of ideas which prohibits their being ranked
according to levels of importance.29
On the other hand, failure to categorize among types of speech
is, in the words of Professor Schauer, "frightfully counter-intui-
tive."30 As he states, "most people believe that some categories [of
speech] are more important than others, with great agreement
about many questions of relative worth. Political argument is sim-
ply more important than 'Specified Sexual Activities,' and Hamlet is
simply better literature than 'Dance With the Dominant Whip.' "31
The problem, of course, with categorization is separating the wheat
from the chaff or, if I may invent a word or two, the problem is
determining which types of speech are the "trivializers" and which
are the "trivialized." This, of course, is the problem that the adher-
ents to the equality of ideas principle wish to avoid. For them, cate-
gorization according to relative worth is simply too subjective and
too value-laden to adequately protect socially controversial or offen-
sive types of speech. Categorization replaces Justice Harlan's value-
neutral "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric,"3 2 with Chief Justice
Burger's value-laden "to equate the free and robust exchange of
ideas with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the
grand conception of the First Amendment.""
The definitional problem with the trivialization argument is ap-
parent when one analyzes the inconsistencies resulting from its ap-
plication. Emerson, for example, (although to be fair he is not
27. See Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 499, 513-14 (1985).
28. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 326.
29. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CI. L.
REv. 20 (1975); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 201-02 (1983).
30. Schauer, supra note 3, at 287.
31. Id. at 288.
32. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
33. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
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explicit on the point) appears to contend that commercial speech
demeans the first amendment because of its emphasis on material-
ism. Approving the (then-existing) commercial speech exclusion,
he states, "[I]t speaks well for a society that it accords greater free-
dom to the exchange of ideas than it gives to the exchange of mate-
rial things.",34  Similar arguments, however, could be made with
regard to categories of speech that are protected. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, for example, has made strong trivialization arguments in rela-
tion to obscenity and nude dancing,35 and Professor Nagel has
forcefully argued that protecting silly or offensive speech has a
demeaning effect.36
I suppose an argument could be made supporting a distinction
in favor of obscene and offensive speech over commercial speech on
trivialization grounds. Such an argument, however, is tenuous at
best. Baker's theory, which belittles commercial speech because it
is market-influenced and aimed at commercial enrichment, 37 could
equally be applied to obscenity, which is primarily, if not solely,
aimed at commercial exploitation. Moreover, even if obscenity
could be characterized as involving political overtones,38 the same
could be said for commercial speech. 39 Finally, there is little to sug-
gest that commercial speech is any less idea-laden than obscene or
offensive speech. Certainly epithets and obscenities promote no
more reasoned discourse than do advertising slogans-does
" 'g[od]-d[amn]-m[other]-f[ucker]' police"' implicate the exchange
of ideas more than a Chrysler commercial which announces "The
Pride is Back-Born in America"? Is a profane epithet of more
notable first amendment consequence than an ad slogan?41
The trivialization argument is therefore unsatisfactory for theo-
rists like Emerson for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with one
34. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 415.
35. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) ("[To equate the free and robust
exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material de-
means the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic
struggle for freedom."); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 88 (1981) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting) ("To invoke the First Amendment to protect the activity involved in this
case trivializes and demeans that Amendment.").
36. Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
302, 329-30 (1984).
37. See Baker, supra note 17.
38. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV.
519, 545 (1979).
39. Redish, supra note 5, at 621.
40. Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972).
41. See Stone, supra note 29, at 244 (analogizing offensive language to noise rather than
ideas).
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of Emerson's central tenets-the equality of speech. Second, it can-
not be consistently used to exclude one category of speech without
seriously hampering the inclusion of another. While the previous
discussion does not resolve the question of whether commercial, ob-
scene or offensive speech is less trivial, it establishes how such a
judgment is unsupported by any rationale other than subjective
evaluation.42 The important question remaining is why would
Emerson exclude commercial speech from coverage, given the in-
consistency that this exclusion creates for his overall theory? To
resolve this problem we must address the devitalization argument.
The devitalization theory generally stresses that by extending
first amendment coverage to too many types of speech, core speech
interests are afforded less protection. 43 The regulation of commer-
cial speech could not be effectively or even meaningfully main-
tained, for example, if it were subject to the exacting scrutiny of
Brandenburg v. Ohio.4 The concern voiced by Emerson and others
is that the absolute, or close-to-absolute, protections applied to
"core" speech will be abandoned in order to accomodate the com-
peting interests presented by the regulation of commercial speech.
Extending first amendment protection to commercial speech, warns
Emerson, "justifies and solidifies full-scale ad hoe balancing in a
way that is bound to affect the whole [first amendment] struc-
ture."
'45
There is strength to this position. As Professor Blasi explains,
"[t]he wider the reach of first amendment coverage, the greater
seems to be the judicial affinity for instrumental reasoning, balanc-
ing tests, differential levels of scrutiny, and pragmatic judgments."4 6
Professor Schauer may also be correct when he argues:
42. It is possible to distinguish commercial from obscene and offensive speech on other
grounds. First, commercial speech is capable of greater regulation than other types of speech
because it is easily verifiable and less likely to be chilled. See, ag., Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986). It could also be argued
that regulation of obscene or offensive speech is suspect because government motivations are
aimed at communicative impact rather than non-speech concerns. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-94 (2d ed. 1988); Scanlon, 4 Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 213 (1972). For an intriguing analogy between commercial speech
and obscenity, see Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L.
REv. 372, 383-84 (1979).
43. See, eg., F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 134-35 (1982);
Blasi, supra note 27, at 449.
44. 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (subversive speech is protected unless it constitutes "incite-
ment to imminent lawless action"); see Schauer, supra note 3, at 270-71.
45. Emerson, supra note 9, at 460.
46. Blasi, supra note 27, at 479.
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The scope of a right and the strength of that right.., most often
occur in inverse proportion to each other .... The broader the
scope of the right, the more likely it is to be weaker, largely be-
cause widening the scope increases the likelihood of conflict with
other interests, some of which may be equally or more
important.47
On the other hand, whether devitalization can be avoided by
categorizing certain types of speech as outside the first amendment
or as lesser-value speech has been the center of much controversy.
First, as Professor Redish has argued, a balancing, rather than ab-
solutist, approach need not harm core speech interests. If there are
more persuasive reasons to regulate commercial speech than polit-
ical speech, the application of a balancing approach will not neces-
sarily subject political speech to government restriction even if
particular regulations of commercial speech are upheld.48 Second,
it may be argued that, there is in any event, an inherent balancing in
the categorization process such that the claim of absolutism for the
protection of "core" speech by those seeking to exclude "non-core"
speech is unfounded. Under this view, the categorical exclusion of
commercial speech, for example, presumes its own balance. 49 Fi-
nally, the point can be ably asserted that judicial expansion of pro-
tected speech in recent years has not led to a "dilution" of the first
amendment, suggesting that the fears of the absolutists have been
misplaced.
In any event, the question of whether expanded coverage neces-
sarily leads to first amendment dilution is probably unresolvable.50
Nonetheless, if it is conceded that first amendment doctrine will not
be devitalized by including previously omitted categories of speech
within constitutional coverage, some harm to "core" speech may
still occur. There could be different results under existing, fully-
vitalized doctrine, which would be less sympathetic to speech inter-
ests. For example, current doctrine indicates that speech can be
restricted on a time, place or manner basis only when the regulation
is supported by an important governmental interest. t Often in a
47. F. SCHAUER, supra note 44, at 134-35.
48. See Redish, supra note 5, at 624.
49. But see generally Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 997-1001 (1987) (rejecting the proposition that all categorical roles are the products
of an inherent balance).
50. Professor Shiffrin has argued that the devitalization problem stems from a false
premise-that there is one unifying theory of free speech. Once it is recognized that there are
varieties of speech, argues Shiffrin, treating different categories dissimilarly will not harm
"core" speech concerns. Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 1282.
51. As Dean Stone suggests, the exact level of importance needed to sustain a restriction
[Vol. 38:566
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time, place or manner case, the state interest involved is the reduc-
tion of noise and congestion. Where access to a bus terminal is
sought for leafletting and solicitation of funds, these interests may
not be significant if there are relatively few persons seeking to en-
gage in the activity (for example, religious adherents or political ac-
tivists). 2 If the range of first amendment speakers, however, were
to include all those seeking to advertise their products, the state's
interest in preventing noise and congestion may become compelling
simply because of the increased number of persons involved. The
greater the state interests at stake could, in short, lead to upholding
the regulation. In this manner, a true harm to core speech interests
could result if political or religious speakers are denied access to a
bus terminal because of the inclusion of commercial speakers. The
key, in short, is not that first amendment doctrine will necessarily
be devitalized. Rather, the results in the cases may lead to first
amendment adherents prevailing less often.
Thus, the fear of dilution of first amendment interests by inclu-
sion of commercial speech in the protected speech category is a real
concern. While the question of whether first amendment doctrine
would actually be devitalized by an expansive notion of first amend-
ment coverage is debatable, the fact that results in specific cases
would change is not. Ardent first amendment defenders like
Thomas Emerson are therefore instinctively correct when they sug-
gest that some first amendment values may be better served if cer-
tain categories of speech are either excluded from, or assigned
second-level status in, first amendment coverage.
The problem, however, is that such exclusion cannot be recon-
ciled with the central tenet that there is equality among ideas.
Strict adherence to the equality principle leads to a "diluted" first
amendment, whereas strict protection against dilution leads to the
creation of hierarchies of speech grounded in problematic inquiries
into the relative value of various forms of speech. In the end, one of
these concerns must give way to the other.
is not clear in current case law. Stone, Conient-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46,
46 (1987).
52. See Wolin v. Port Authority of New York, 393 F.2d 83, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968).
